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We study when agents can have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common 
knowledge that the posteriors for an event E coincide. For any finite number of agents, we 
recast this possibility of agreeing to agree as the existence of a common prior which solves a 
linear system of homogeneous equations. The formulation yields a dual characterization of 
agreeing to agree in terms of state-contingent trades: agreeing to agree is possible if and only 
if no p-trade based on the occurrence of E generates a risk-free arbitrage opportunity. We use 
our results to characterize agreeing to agree with more than two agents in terms of 
information structure. In particular, the condition of common knowledge of ignorance 
proposed by Lehrer and Samet (2011) is no longer sufficient. 
 
 
AGREEING TO AGREE AND TRADE
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Agreeing to disagree and agreeing to agree. Can agents have
common knowledge of their beliefs when they are di¤erent? Aumann (1976)
has demonstrated the impossibility of agreeing to disagree: For any posteriors
with a common prior, if the agentsposteriors for an event E are di¤erent (=
they disagree), then the agents cannot have common knowledge (= agreeing),
of these posteriors.
But there can be other reasons why agents may fail to have common
knowledge of their beliefs, even when these beliefs are the same. Lehrer
and Samet (2011) have examined the conditions under which there exist
posteriors with a common prior, such that it is common knowledge that the
agentsposteriors for an event E coincide. They have shown that a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for agreeing to agree with two agents is the existence
of a non-empty nite event F with the following two properties. First, it
is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot tell whether or not E
occurred. Second, this still holds true at F , when F itself becomes common
knowledge.
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In Lehrer and Samet (2011), all the results were formulated and proved
for models with two agents. However, in almost everything, multiple agents
are involved, and hence agreeing to agree with multiple agents needs to be
carefully analyzed. In this paper, we examine the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the possibility of agreeing to agree in models with multiple
agents. Our rst observation is that for any nite number of agents, we can
recast this possibility of agreeing to agree as the existence of a common prior
which solves a linear system of homogeneous equations.
1.2 The existence of a common prior which solves a linear system
of homogeneous equations. So what is agreeing to agree? Conceptually,
it simply means that everyones posterior for event E is the same, everyone
knows that everyones posterior for event E is the same, everyone knows that
everyone knows that everyones posterior for event E is the same, and so on.
With this idea in mind, the possibility of agreeing to agree is equivalent to the
existence of a non-empty nite event F such that after F becomes common
knowledge, posteriors for all agents are the same.
We can recast the possibility of agreeing to agree as the existence of a
common prior which solves a linear system of homogeneous equations. A
common prior determines the posteriors only on elements of the partition
to which it assigns positive probability; on elements of probability zero the
posteriors can be dened arbitrarily. Consider a particular agent, for any
element of the partition with positive probability, we can mathematically
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form a linear equation based on that the posterior for event E is the same.
Consider each partition for each agent, we can form a linear system of ho-
mogeneous equations, which may or may not admit a nonnegative nontrivial
solution, and hence there may or may not exist a common prior such that
the posteriors for the event E are the same (the common prior can simply be
standardized from the nonnegative nontrivial solution of the linear system of
homogeneous equations).
Since we know that agreement with posterior p for some 0 < p < 1 is a
subset of ignorance, common knowledge of agreement is a subset of common
knowledge of ignorance. Thus, we can form the linear system of homogeneous
equations based on the entire set of common knowledge of ignorance. If the
linear system admits a nonnegative nontrivial solution, the non-empty nite
event F is found. On the other hand, if the linear system does not admit a
nonnegative nontrivial solution, there does not exist such a non-empty nite
event F .
1.3 The paper plan. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we introduce two contrasting examples to illustrate the
equations approach. In section 3, the basics of the model of knowledge and
belief are introduced. We characterize agreeing to agree in term of state-
contingent trades in section 4 and in terms of information structure in section
5. We conclude with some applications of our results in the last section.
3
2 EXAMPLES
Example 1(a). Each of the three rms can be either protable (1) or losing
(0). There are eight possible states of the world (1; 1; 1), (1; 1; 0), (0; 1; 1),
(1; 0; 1), (0; 0; 0), (1; 0; 0), (0; 1; 0) and (0; 0; 1). Each rm knows only how
well it does.
Consider the event E that all rms have the same nancial situation.
That is, E = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 0; 0)g:There are many posteriors that have a com-
mon prior such that the rms have common knowledge that the posteriors
for event E coincide.
To see this, suppose  is a common prior ((1; 1; 1) = a; (0; 0; 0) =
b; (1; 1; 0) = c; (0; 1; 1) = d; (1; 0; 1) = e; (1; 0; 0) = f; (0; 1; 0) = g; (0; 0; 1) =
h) and that it is common knowledge that all posteriors of E are p for some
0 < p < 1.
First note that a 6= 0: Suppose to the contrary a = 0 ) c = e = f = 0
(otherwise, the posterior probability of E for the rst rm when the rm
is protable would be 0). Similarly, d = g = 0 considering the second rm
when it is protable and h = 0 considering the third rm when it is protable
) b = 0 (otherwise, the posterior probability of E for the rst rm when
the rm is losing would be 1). Hence (
) = 0 and contradiction, a 6= 0.
Similarly we can show that b 6= 0:
We form the following equations:
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consider 0 2 1; bb+d+g+h = p;
consider 1 2 1; aa+c+e+f = p;
consider 0 2 2; bb+e+f+h = p;
consider 1 2 2; aa+c+d+g = p;
consider 0 2 3; bb+c+f+g = p;
consider 1 2 3; aa+d+e+h = p:
Equivalently, the following linear system of homogeneous equations:
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0   p
1 p 0   p1 p   p1 p 0 0
0 1 0   p
1 p 0 0   p1 p   p1 p
1 0   p
1 p   p1 p 0 0   p1 p 0
0 1 0 0   p
1 p   p1 p 0   p1 p
1 0 0   p
1 p   p1 p 0 0   p1 p
0 1   p













There are many possible ways that these equations hold simultaneously.
For instance, a = 2p
3
; b = p
3
; c = d = e = 1 p
3
and f = g = h = 0. In each
of the eight states, all rms have the same posterior for E : p: Thus, it is
common knowledge in every state that the posteriors for E are the same.
Example 2(a). In the state space of the previous example, consider the
event E that at least two rms are protable. That is, E = f(1; 1; 1), (1; 1; 0),
(0; 1; 1), (1; 0; 1)g: In each state, no rm can tell whether or not at least two
rms are protable. Therefore, it is common knowledge in each state that
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all rms are ignorant of E. However, agreeing to agree is not possible, that
is, no matter what the posteriors with a common prior the rms may have,
there can be no common knowledge that all posteriors for E are p, for some
0 < p < 1.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that  is a common prior ((1; 1; 1) =
a; (1; 1; 0) = b; (0; 1; 1) = c; (1; 0; 1) = d; (0; 0; 0) = w; (1; 0; 0) =
x; (0; 1; 0) = y; (0; 0; 1) = z) and that it is common knowledge that all
posteriors of E are p for some 0 < p < 1.
First note that b 6= 0: Suppose to the contrary, b = 0 ) w = x = y = 0
(otherwise, the posterior probability of E for the third rm when the rm
is losing would be 0). Similarly, a = d = 0 considering the rst rm when
the rm is protable and c = 0 considering the second rm when the rm
is protable. ) z = 0 considering the rst rm when the rm is losing.
Hence (
) = 0 and contradiction, b 6= 0: Similarly, we can show that
c 6= 0; d 6= 0; x 6= 0; y 6= 0; z 6= 0:
We form the following equations:
consider 0 2 1; cc+w+y+z = p;
consider 1 2 1; a+b+da+b+d+x = p;
consider 0 2 2; dd+w+x+z = p;
consider 1 2 2; a+b+ca+b+c+y = p;
consider 0 2 3; bb+w+x+y = p;
consider 1 2 3; a+c+dz+c+d+z = p:
6
Equivalently, the following linear system of homogeneous equations:
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 1 0 1 0   p
1 p 0 0
0 0 1 0   p
1 p 0   p1 p   p1 p
1 1 1 0 0 0   p
1 p 0
0 0 0 1   p
1 p   p1 p 0   p1 p
1 0 1 1 0 0 0   p
1 p
0 1 0 0   p













From the 1st equation, d < p
1 p  x. From the 4th equation d > p1 p ,
contradiction. It is impossible for these equations to hold simultaneously and
hence agreeing to agree is not possible. The agents cannot have posteriors
with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors
coincide.
This example also illustrates that the theorem by Lehrer and Samet
(2011) no longer holds for multiple agents (N > 3). In this example, all
rms are ignorant of E in each state. Thus, it is common knowledge that
they are ignorant of E: Formally, the condition that there exists a non-empty
nite event F = 





3 ) is satised, however, agreeing to agree is not possible.
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3 PRELIMINARY
Throughout this paper, our notations as well as the model are consistent
with Lehrer and Samet (2011), with extension to multiple agents.
3.1 Information structures. We x a state space (
; B) with a set of
states 
 and a -eld of events B. An information structure on the state
space, for all N agents, is (1;2; :::;N) of countable measurable partitions
of 
: For every state ! we denote by i(!) the element in i that contains
!.
3.2 Knowledge and common knowledge. We say that agent i knows
event E at ! when i(!)  E: Thus, the event that i knows E is Ki(E) =
f!ji(!)  Eg: The event that all agents know E is K(E) = \Ni=1Ki(E):
The event that E is common knowledge is K1(E) = \1n=1Kn(E):
3.3 Posteriors and priors. A posterior of agent i, for the information
structure (1;2; :::;N); is a family of probability measures f!i g on (
; B)
for i 2 N and each !; such that !i (i(!)) = 1 and for each !0 2 i(!);
!i = 
!0
i : A common prior for the posteriors of the agents is a probability
measure  on (
; B) such that !i () = (ji(!)) whenever (i(!)) > 0:
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4 AGREEING TO AGREE AND TRADE
4.1 Trade based on the occurrence of E. Think of an asset. Given any
quoted price, you cannot make prot without taking the risk, whether buy
or sell, that is, you cannot make prot in every state of the world. However,
if you can nd two agents where the rst agent values the asset at p whereas
the second agent values the asset at q > p, you can perform a combination of
trades (explicitly, buy the asset from the rst agent at a slightly lower price
p and simultaneously sell to the second agent at a slightly higher price q)
and make a risk-free prot (q  p). Note that the two agents are also willing
to trade.
The idea of this paper is quite similar, if agreeing to agree for an event
E is not possible, we can nd agents who relatively overestimate the proba-
bility of some events occurring and agents who relatively underestimate the
probability of some events occurring. Furthermore, we can identify a mul-
tilateral trade which generates a risk-free arbitrage opportunity. Simply by
distributing the prots equally among all the agents, all agents would be
better o¤.
In this paper, here is what we mean by p-trade. For a particular agent, he
is willing to trade in the following ways: 1) The agent gains 1 if event E occurs
and loses p
1 p if event E does not occur; 2) The agent loses 1 if event E occurs
and gains p
1 p if event E does not occur: Notice that both trades are fair from
the agents perspective, because given his posterior probability, the expected
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payo¤ of the rst trade for the agent is p  1 + (1  p)  (  p
1 p) = 0 and the
expected payo¤of the second trade for the agent is p( 1)+(1 p) p
1 p = 0:
Also notice that buying the second trade is equivalent to selling the rst trade.
For simplicity, in the remaining of this paper, we only need to consider the
rst type of trades, but we can both buy and sell.
4.2 Characterizing agreeing to agree in terms of state-contingent
trades. We nd out the following relationship between agreeing to agree and
no trade: Agreeing to agree is possible if and only if no trade based on the
occurrence of E generates a risk-free arbitrage opportunity. We illustrate
using the same two examples. In example 1, agreeing to agree is possible and
there are no such multilateral trades. In example 2, agreeing to agree is not
possible and a multilateral trade which generates a risk-free opportunity is
given.
Example 1b. In this example where agreeing to agree is possible, it is
easy to show that any ex-ante multilateral trade wont be able to produce
benet in every state of the world. We start by listing all the possible trades,
considering all partitions of each agent, as represented in the following matrix.
Each column represents a trade and each row represent a possible state of
the world. And each entry (i; j) represents the payo¤ of the j-th trade in
the i-th state. The rst two columns represent trades with the rst rm,
the next two columns represent the trades with second rm and the last two
columns represent trades with the third rm.
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0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
  p
1 p 0   p1 p 0 0   p1 p
0   p
1 p   p1 p 0   p1 p 0
  p
1 p 0 0   p1 p   p1 p 0
  p
1 p 0 0   p1 p 0   p1 p
0   p
1 p   p1 p 0 0   p1 p
0   p
1 p   p1 p   p1 p 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
It su¢ ces to show that for any multilateral trade (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6)T
(meaning that we perform the rst trade x1 times, the second x2 times, etc.
A positive number means buying the trade and a negative number means
selling the trade), it is not possible to be benecial in every state of the
world.
Suppose to the contrary, it is possible that a multilateral trade (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6)T
is benecial in every state of the world.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
  p
1 p 0   p1 p 0 0   p1 p
0   p
1 p   p1 p 0   p1 p 0
  p
1 p 0 0   p1 p   p1 p 0
  p
1 p 0 0   p1 p 0   p1 p
0   p
1 p   p1 p 0 0   p1 p
0   p













Summing up the rst and second inequalities, x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6 > 0:
Summing up the last six inequalities,   3p
1 p(x1+x2+x3+x4+x5+x6) < 0,
contradiction.
We showed that any ex-ante multilateral trade wont be able to produce
benet in every state of the world.
Example 2b. To see why agreeing to agree is not possible in this case,
suppose to the contrary agreeing to agree is possible with posteriors p. We
can construct a multilateral trade in such a way so that the trade is benecial
in every state of the world: ( 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1)T : The payo¤ of the trades is0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1
  p
1 p 0   p1 p 0   p1 p 0
0   p
1 p   p1 p 0   p1 p 0
  p
1 p 0 0   p1 p   p1 p 0
  p



























4.3 Agreements. An agreement is an event that the posteriors of the
agents coincide at some given probability. Formally,
Denition 1. Let E be an event in the state space (
; B) with infor-
mation structure (1;2; :::;N) and posteriors . An agreement on E is an
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event A = f!j!i (E) = p;8i 2 N and some 0 < p < 1g:
Next we formally dene the possibility that there is common knowledge
of an agreement.
Denition 2. Let E be an event in the state space (
; B) with informa-
tion structure (1;2; :::;N). Agreeing to agree is possible for E if there
are posteriors with a common prior ; and an agreement A on E for there
posteriors, such that (K1(A)) > 0:
Denition 3. The event that agent i is ignorant ofE is Ii(E) = :Ki(E)\
:Ki(:E): The event that all agents are ignorant of E is I(E) = \Ni=1Ii(E):
Thus, I(E) is the event that none of the agents can tell whether or not E
occurred.
4.4 The main results. Our rst theorem states that for any nite num-
ber of agents, we recast this possibility of agreeing to agree as the existence
of a common prior which solves a linear system of homogeneous equations.
Formally,
Theorem 1. Agreeing to agree is possible if and only if there exists
a non-empty nite event F such that 8i 2 N; 8P 2 i \ F with (P ) >
0; (P \ E) = p
1 p  (P \ :E) w:r:t Fi :
Proof: 1) Since there exists a non-empty nite event F such that 8i 2
N; 8P 2 i \ F with (P ) > 0; (P \ E) = p1 p  (P \ :E) w:r:t Fi , we
13
form the linear system of homogenous equations and denote the nonnegative
nontrivial solution to this linear system of homogeneous equations (a; b; c; :::)
and let sum = a+ b+ c:::
Claim: the agents can have posteriors with the following common prior







for states in F and 0 elsewhere.
Since 8i 2 N; 8P 2 i \ F with (P ) > 0; (P \ E) = p1 p  (P \ :E)
w:r:t Fi ;
(P \ E) = p
1 p  (P \ :E) w:r:t i; and P 2 A:
8P with (P ) = 0; since the posteriors can be dened arbitrarily, we
dene P 2 A:

  A; agreeing to agree is possible.
2) Since agreeing to agree is possible, (K1(A)) > 0; and K1(A) 6= ;:
Let F = K1(A)  K1(I(E));
8i 2 N; 8P 2 i \ F with (P ) > 0;
P 2 F = K1(A)  A; and (P\E)
(P )
= p;
(P \ E) = p
1 p  (P \ :E):
Denition 4. For a particular agent whose posterior for the event E is
p, a p-trade based on the occurrence of E is a trade where 1) the agent gains
1 if event E occurs and loses p
1 p if event E does not occur or 2) the agent
loses 1 if event E occurs and gains p
1 p if event E does not occur. We can
denote the payo¤ of a trade in a column vector (x1; x2; x3; :::)T , meaning that
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the payo¤ of the trade in the rst state is x1, in the second state is x2 and
so on. Note that the matrix AT represented all possible p-trade.
Denition 5. A multilateral p-trade is a portfolio  = (a; b; c; :::)T ,
conducting the rst trade a times, the second trade b times, and so on. The
payo¤ of a multilateral trade is AT :A risk-free arbitrage opportunity is a
multilateral p-trade with strictly positive payo¤ in all states.
Next we characterize agreeing to agree in terms of state-contingent trades:
Agreeing to agree is possible if and only if no p-trade based on the occurrence
of E generates a risk-free arbitrage opportunity. Formally,
Theorem 2. Agreeing to agree is possible if and only if there is no
multilateral p-trade  such that AT   > 0.
Proof: Since it is trivial that K1(A)  K1(I(E)); we simply focus
on the set K1(I(E)):Lets denote the system of homogeneous equations by
Ax = 0: Agreeing to agree is possible if and only if the system of homogeneous
equations would admit a nontrivial nonnegative solution, in other words, 9x
such that Ax = 0; x  0 and x = 1. This is equivalent to the existence
of an x such that Ax = 0; x  0 and x = ";8" > 0. By gales theorem
of alternatives, it is further equivalent to the nonexistence of  such that
AT > 0:
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5 AGREEING TO AGREE IN TERMS OF
INFORMATION STRUCTURE
5.1 Generalizing the notion of a loop (Loop+). In Lehrer and Samet
(2011), the characterization of agreeing to agree in terms of information
structure for two agents is the existence of common knowledge of ignorance
and essentially, the existence of a loop. Among all the properties the loop
exhibits, we observe that the single most important property is that by as-
signing equal probability to each element in the loop, agreeing to agree is
possible with posterior 1
2
:
From this observation, we introduce the generalization of a loop for mul-
tiple agents (loop+), which preserves the property that by assigning equal
probability to each element in loop+, agreeing to agree is possible. However,
we note that in order to achieve the property that, by assigning equal proba-
bility to each element in the loop, agreeing to agree is possible with posterior
1
2
; loop for two agents can simply be viewed as deleting unnecessary states
(all the states in loop are distinct). Unlike loop for two agents, loop+ for mul-
tiple agents requires adding states (or duplication of states), as illustrated in
the following example.
Example 1c. It is trivial that by simply deleting states, a loop+ with
the property that by assigning equal probability to each element in the loop,
agreeing to agree is possible with posterior 1
2
can never be found. In this case,
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a loop+ is that !1 = (1; 1; 1), !01 = (1; 0; 0), !2 = (0; 0; 0), !
0
2 = (0; 1; 0),
!3 = (0; 0; 0), !03 = (0; 0; 1) such that by assigning equal probability to
each element in this loop+ ((1; 1; 1) = (1; 0; 0) = (0; 1; 0) = (0; 0; 1) =
1
6
; (1; 1; 1) = 1
3
because (1; 1; 1) appears twice in this loop+); agreeing to
agree is possible with posterior 1
2
.
We can think of the loop for two agents is a special case of loop+: It has
been shown in Lehrer and Samet (2011) and in this paper as well that, loop
for two agents (and also loop+ for two agents) exists if and only if there is
common knowledge of ignorance. However, unlike loop for two players, given
the existence of common knowledge of ignorance, loop+ does not always exists
for more than two agents, and hence the existence of common knowledge
of ignorance is not su¢ cient to show that agreeing to agree is possible for
multiple agents, as in example 2. (Loop+ by denition guarantees agreeing
to agree and hence, the impossibility of agreeing agree rules out the existence
of a loop+).
5.2 Characterizing agreeing to agree in terms of information
structure. Recall the two properties that loop+ di¤ers from the loop for
two agents. One distinction is that common knowledge of ignorance alone
although guarantees the existence of a loop for two players, it does not guar-
antee the existence of a loop+ for multiple agents (N > 3). And hence we
impose a stronger condition of common knowledge of proportion: agreeing
to agree is possible if and only if there exists a non-empty nite event F such
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that after F becomes common knowledge, for each partition for each agent,
the proportion of the number of states in E to the number of states in :E
is constant. The other distinction is that unlike loop, states in loop+ are
not necessarily distinct. Therefore, we allow the cases where one state can
appear many times in the event F:
Example 1d. Consider F = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 0; 0); (0; 0; 0); (1; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 1)g:
And the constant proportion is 1.
This result is mathematically equivalent to our rst observation that the
possibility of agreeing to agree can be recasted as the existence of a common
prior which solves a linear system of homogeneous equations. However, this
characterization depends only on the structure of the event and the parti-
tions.
Theorem 3. Agreeing to agree is possible if and only if there exists a
non-empty nite event F such that after F becomes common knowledge, for
each partition for each agent, the proportion of the number of states in E to
the number of states in :E is constant.
Proof: It follows directly from Theorem 1.
1) Since agreeing to agree is possible, there exists a non-empty nite event
F 0 such that after F 0 becomes common knowledge, the system of homoge-
neous equations admits a nonnegative nontrivial solution, which we denote
by (a; b; c; :::).
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Therefore, our non-empty nite event F is that the rst state in F 0 ap-
pears a times, the second state in F 0 appears b times, and so on. After F
becomes common knowledge, for each partition for each agent, the proportion
of the number of states in E to the number of states in :E is constant.
2) If there exists a non-empty nite event F such that after F becomes
common knowledge, for each partition for each agent, the proportion of the
number of states in E to the number of states in :E is constant, say p.
After F becomes common knowledge, by assigning equal probability to
each state in F , the linear system of homogeneous equations admits a non-
negative nontrivial solution, agreeing to agree is possible.
6 APPLICATION
6.1 The possibility of agreeing to agree is independent of the choice of p:
Formally, if agreeing to agree is possible for E with an agreement A =
f!j!i (E) = p;8i 2 N and some 0 < p < 1g, then 80 < p0 < 1; agreeing to
agree is possible for E with an agreement A0 = f!j!i (E) = p0;8i 2 Ng:
Proof: Since agreeing to agree is possible for E with an agreement A =
f!j!i (E) = p;8i 2 N and some 0 < p < 1g; by theorem 1, there exists
a non-empty nite event F such that 8i 2 N; 8P 2 i \ F with (P ) >
0; (P \ E) = p
1 p  (P \ :E) w:r:t Fi :
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The linear system of homogeneous equations (P\E)  p
1 p (P\:E) =
0 admits a nonnegative nontrivial solution. Lets denote one such solution
(x1; x2; :::; y1; y2; :::):
80 < p0 < 1; it is trivial that the linear system of homogeneous equations
(P \ E)   p0
1 p0  (P \ :E) = 0 also admits a nonnegative nontrivial
solution (p
0(1 p)
p(1 p0)  x1; p
0(1 p)
p(1 p0)  x2:::y1; y2:::): Standardization produces the
common prior such that agreeing to agree is possible for E with an agreement
A0 = f!j!i (E) = p0;8i 2 Ng:
6.2 We provide a simple proof of the following theorem by Lehrer and
Samet (2011) using the equations approach: for two agents, agreeing to agree
is possible for event E if and only if there exists a non-empty nite event F
such that F  K1(I(E)) w:r:t: both (1;2) and (F1 ;F2 ):
Proof: 1) Since there exists a non-empty nite event F such that F 
K1(I(E)) w:r:t: both (1;2) and (F1 ;
F
2 ); we can construct a linear sys-
tem of homogeneous equations based on F and it su¢ ces to show that the
linear system admits a nonnegative nontrivial solution. Since the existence
of a nonnegative nontrivial solution does not depend on the choice of p; for
simplicity we examine the case when p = 1
2
:
Consider Ax = (u1; u2; u3:::; v1; v2; v3:::)x = 0: Note the special structure
of the matrix A : the number of columns is the cardinality of F; the number
of u columns is the cardinality of F \ E; the number of v columns is the
cardinality of F \ :E; the number of rows for the rst agent is the number
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of distinct partitions in F1 ; the number of rows for the second agent is the
number of distinct partitions in F2 : Furthermore, in each u column, there
are exactly two entries equal to 1; one for the rst agent and one for the
second agent; in each v column, there are exactly two entries equal to  1;
one for the rst agent and one for the second agent. For each 1 in the i-th
row, there is at least one  1 in the same row in the right half of the matrix;
for each  1 in the j-th row, there is at least one 1 in the same row in the
left half of the matrix.
Let S0 = 0; S1 = u1 and we can construct a series in the following way:
only one column is added at one time and the sum of absolute value of the
entries in S is less than or equals 2:
Since there are only nite number of states in F; it is not possible that
all the elements in the series are distinct. There exists m and n (m > n)
such that Sm = Sn: Sm   Sn = x1  u1 + x2  u2 + ::: + y1  v1 + y2  v2 +
::: = A  x = 0: The system of equations admits a nonnegative nontrivial
solution (x1; x2; :::; y1; y2; :::): Standardization produces a common prior such
that agreeing to agree is possible for E with an agreement A = f!j!i (E) =
1
2
; 8i 2 Ng. 80 < p0 < 1; agreeing to agree is possible forE with an agreement
A0 = f!j!i (E) = p0;8i 2 Ng:
2) Next we show the necessary condition for agreeing to agree is that
there exists a non-empty nite event F such that F  K1(I(E)) w:r:t: both




Since agreeing to agree is possible, if K1(A) contains nite number of
states, F = K1(A) such that F  K1(I(E)) w:r:t: both (1;2) and
(F1 ;
F
2 ); the proof is complete.
If K1(A) contains innite number of states, assume that there exists a
loop+ L on E such that L  K1(I(E)); F = L such that F  K1(I(E))
w:r:t: both (1;2) and (F1 ;
F
2 ); the proof is complete.
Otherwise, for every loop+ L; L * K1(I(E)): L \K1(I(E)) = ;: Since
A = f!j!i (E) = p;8i 2 N and some 0 < p < 1g; 8! 2 A; ! 2 I(E):
A  I(E) and K1(A)  K1(I(E)): Therefore, L \ K1(A) = ;: For any
partition P0 2 1 and P0  K1(A), P0 \ L = ; for all loop+ L on E:
Suppose (P0) 6= 0; (P0 \ E) 6= 0: Let (P0 \ E) = a > 0; using the
equation approach, it is clear that (K1(A)) = 1  a = 1; contradiction.
Therefore (P0) = 0: Since the partitions are countable, this implied that
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